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Iraq, the central issue that destabilized George W. Bush’s time in office, has provided Obama with a rare success story during his first year in the White House, whilst the US unemployment rate has 
proven stubbornly resistant to his bold economic policy initiatives. A major push on healthcare reform 
has forced this idealistic president to confront the compromising realities of doing politics within the 
belt way. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly undermined President Obama’s call 
for a freeze on house building in the occupied Palestinian territories, in effect, removing the central 
plank of Obama’s Middle East peace initiative. Finally, after a prolonged period of embarrassing 
vacillation and indecisiveness, the Obama Administration has inherited an Afghan policy that George 
W. Bush would be proud of.  On Iraq, however, Obama has managed to successfully implement 
his key election promise of quickly reducing American commitment to the country, drawing down 
US combat forces and the money spent on reconstruction. To date, this has been achieved while 
politically motivated violence across Iraq has continued to drop. However, has this rare success story 
during Obama’s first year been delivered by the new president’s courage and commitment or has he 
simply benefited from the legacy of his predecessor and the policy initiative implemented in the last 
two years of Bush’s second term?
CAMPAIGN PROMISES
In both the Democratic Primaries and the Presidential election, Barack Obama’s policy on Iraq appeared 
to be unambiguous, bold and brave.  It became his ‘signature issue’ during the primaries and clearly 
helped him win a decisive victory over Hilary Clinton with her more complex, if not mendacious, policy 
on the future of US involvement. During the election, the Iraq issue allowed Obama to draw a stark 
comparison with Senator John McCain. In doing so he convinced a large section of the American 
electorate that he could deliver peace with honour in Iraq, portraying McCain as being detached from 
both American and Iraqi realties. McCain was overtly criticised for simply continuing with the Bush 
approach, thereby tainting himself with all the problems that surrounded the president.
In contrast, Obama boldly stated that on his first day in office he would give the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff “a new mission that is to end this war”. Obama’s strict timetable for pulling out two brigades 
of US combat troops a month would mean that none would remain in the country by the summer 
of 2010. This formed the core of his plan: Turning the page in Iraq, launched in September 2007. 
The only caveat placed on this commitment was a “residual force” to be left in Iraq after the main 
bulk of American combat troops had left. It’s role would be to train the Iraqi military, fight al Qaeda 
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and deal with the “potential re-emergence of Shia militias.” For a war-weary American 
electorate, Obama offered a seemingly unambiguous exit, a road home from the arduous 
and costly Republican adventure in Baghdad that had cost so much blood and treasure.
INHERITING THE BUSH LEGACY
It can be persuasively argued that two of the polices pursued by George W. Bush from 
January 2007 onwards made it possible for President Obama to successfully extricate 
America from Iraq without the country descending into another internecine conflict. At 
the height of the Iraq civil war, in January 2007, 3500 Iraqi civilians were murdered in one 
month. This forced George W. Bush to announce a new policy, a ‘surge’ in the number of 
US combat troops and their aggressive repositioning amongst the Iraqi population. This 
change in US policy and troop posture resulted in a steady decline in Iraqi civilian deaths. 
All those organisations collating casualty figures in Iraq agree that 2009 has seen the 
lowest death toll since the invasion in 2003. The Iraqi government estimates that 6,772 
people were killed in 2008 and 3,492 in 2009 compared with 13,896 in 2006. This still 
makes Baghdad one of the most dangerous cities in the world and means that more 
people in Iraq are killed by terrorism than any other country. However, compared with 
the all-out sectarian carnage of 2006-7, this decline in the death rate does represent a 
major step forward and has facilitated Obama’s ability to rapidly reduce US troop numbers.
A second major legacy that Obama inherited from George W. Bush clearly aided his 
disengagement plans. On 27 November 2008, the Iraqi parliament ratified a new Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a Strategic Framework Agreement. This formally codified 
relations between the Government of Iraq and the United States for the first time since 
the invasion. It was the passing of these two agreements at the end of 2008 that set the 
date for the end of the American occupation of Iraq. 
The lengthy and at times antagonistic negotiations that resulted in the SOFA were 
indicative of how relations between Washington and Baghdad had been transformed 
long before Obama was elected. The process began in 2007, when President Bush and 
Prime Minister Maliki committed their respective governments to a legal agreement that 
would formalise long-term relations between the two countries in the aftermath of the 
invasion and regime change. 
In March 2008, the US government sent a large team of lawyers to Baghdad to begin 
the negotiations. The complete rejection by Baghdad of the American lawyer’s first treaty 
draft signified how much the US had misunderstood the transformation of Iraqi politics 
over the course of 2008. By the time substantive negotiations on the SOFA began in 
Baghdad, Prime Minister Maliki had secured his grip on power and had boosted his 
popular support by repeatedly playing the nationalist card. As SOFA negotiations dragged 
on, Maliki increasingly couched his opposition to some of its more objectionable clauses 
in terms of Iraqi national sovereignty. The popular approval this won him encouraged 
an even tougher negotiating stance. In Washington, President Bush became ever more 
eager to conclude an agreement before he left office, bringing a degree of closure to the 
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most contentious issue of his presidency. The American presidential cycle and the growing confidence of 
the Iraqi Prime Minister combined to give much greater leverage to Iraq. The final agreement saw the Iraqi 
government achieve the majority of its demands and the US were forced into making a series of significant 
and far-reaching concessions.
The most important concession extracted from the US by tough Iraqi negotiating was an unambiguous 
timetable for US troop withdrawal. The final document left no room for doubt. First, all US combat forces 
were withdrawn from Iraqi cities, towns and villages by 30 June, 2009. As a result American troops ceased 
to have a sustained security presence in Iraq and were instead redeployed to a limited number of designated 
bases outside heavily populated areas. Once US forces were withdrawn to these bases, the agreement gave 
them two and a half years to leave the country. Article 24 of the treaty states that “all US forces are to 
withdraw from all Iraqi territory, water and airspace no later than the 31st of December of 2011.” 
The degree to which the Iraqi-American treaty, negotiated by George Bush, directly facilitated the successful 
realisation of Obama’s Iraq policy is indicated by the fact that the SOFA goes much further than Barak 
Obama’s own electoral promises. Obama’s commitment to pulling US combat troops out of the country was 
balanced by his commitment to leave behind a ‘residual force’ of US troops. This force of around 30,000 
would train the Iraqi military, fight al Qaeda and deal with Iraqi militias. Under the SOFA however, no US 
troops with any combat role can remain in Iraq after 2011. A training mission is certainly permissible but 
a US role in actively fighting al Qaeda or the Shia militias is expressly forbidden, effectively placing major 
constraints on Obama’s own stated policy in Iraq.
IRAQI REALITIES
The final dynamic that has greatly aided Obama’s ability to implement his Iraq policy has little or nothing 
to do with the influence of US policy. Instead, from 2007 onwards, Iraqi politics have been so transformed 
that a US troop presence became largely irrelevant. The first aspect of this transformation was the effect 
the civil war had on sectarian demographics in Baghdad. Those analysts who remained sceptical about 
the success of President Bush’s surge instead blamed widespread population transfers triggered by the 
sectarian warfare that dominated Baghdad until 2007 for the reduction in violence.  The Shia militias, the 
Badr Brigade and Jaish al Mahdi, deliberately set out to drive Sunni residents from mixed neighbourhoods 
and from Baghdad altogether. Estimates vary on how many people were displaced in this sectarian warfare 
but the US military estimates 350,000. Of these, an Associated Press survey carried out in March 2009 
estimated that only 16 percent have returned to their former homes. This argument suggests that once the 
surge began in early 2007, the civil war had already succeeded in dividing Baghdad, driving a large number 
of Sunnis from the city. It is this sectarian division of the city that analysts argue reduced inter-communal 
violence. Thus, Obama could agree to the rapid reduction in the US troop presence across Baghdad since 
the Shia death squads had succeeded in creating religiously homogeneous communities. Those backing this 
explanation would point to an increase in bombings in March and April 2009, suggesting this was caused 
by the removal of a small number of security walls by the Iraqi government.
The second change in Iraqi politics that allowed Obama to reduce US troops without a return to civil war 
was the rapid increase in the power of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the coherence of the Iraqi 
state. Nuri al Maliki became Prime Minister after months of negotiations in the spring of 2006. For the first 
three years, his premiership was chronically weak, beset by numerous plots to unseat him, a set of powerful 
cabinet ministers over which he had little control and a widespread perception that he was little more than 
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an American puppet. However, the extent to which 
Maliki consolidated power in the office of the prime 
minister became apparent in March 2008. Without US 
approval Maliki moved 30,000 Iraqi troops south to 
Basra to retake the city from the Shia militia, the Jaish 
al Mahdi. They met much stronger opposition than 
had been anticipated and defeat was only avoided 
by heavily reliance on American combat advisors and 
air power. However, the eventual re-establishment of 
government authority in Basra struck a widespread 
popular chord with an Iraqi population long subject 
to criminality and sectarian violence. Maliki went 
on to bolster his new found popular appeal in May 
2008, by regaining control of the Sadr City area in 
Baghdad, the huge slum that had until then been 
dominated by the Jaish al Mahdi.
Maliki used this new-found Iraqi nationalism and 
his role as the champion of a strong Iraqi state to 
win the December 2008 provincial elections. He 
named his coalition, Dawlat al-Qanoun (State of Law), 
to remind the population that the Prime Minister’s 
policies and actions had brought increased law and 
order to Iraq. On the campaign trail, Maliki stressed 
the success of the military campaigns in Basra and 
Sadr City as well as his role in challenging the Kurdish 
Regional Government’s attempts to gain control over 
areas along its boundary with the rest of Iraq. In a 
key campaign speech, he set himself against the 
decentralised federal agenda championed by US 
Vice-President Joe Biden and damned the policies of 
key US allies in Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq and their partners in government, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 
Amongst a generally fractured and diverse result, this 
statist and nationalist approach saw Maliki’s coalition 
win the largest slice of the popular vote in nine out 
of the 14 participating provinces.  Once the seats 
were allocated, State of Law won outright majorities 
in both Baghdad and Basra. It only failed to win 
Sunni-dominated Anbar, mainly Sunni Salah Al-Din, 
Shia-dominated Karbala, and the mixed provinces 
of Diyala and Nineva.
The increasing confidence of Prime Minister Nuri 
al Mailki and his assertiveness in negotiating a 
very favourable Status of Forces Agreement with 
the United States indicates how Iraqi politics were 
transformed in the final eight to twelve months of 
George W. Bush’s presidency. It is this transformation 
and the dramatic reduction in violence across the 
whole of the country that has allowed President 
Obama to successfully pursue his Iraq policy in a 
comparatively trouble-free way. Obama’s electoral 
platform on Iraq was indeed bold and unambiguous. 
It allowed him to distance himself from the myriad 
foreign policy failures of George W. Bush whist 
portraying his rival for power, John McCain, as both 
detached from the mainstream of American domestic 
opinion, offering little more than a continuation of 
previous Republican policy. 
That Iraq has given Obama one of the few policy 
successes of his fist twelve months in office is 
somewhat ironic. Success in Baghdad has been largely 
built upon decisions taken by his predecessor and 
the actions of Iraqi politicians, Nuri al Maliki amongst 
them, over which the new President has had little 
or no influence. If Iraqi politics continues to head 
in a positive direction over what is left of Obama’s 
first term, then the President’s good fortune begins 
to look like astute political planning. However, if 
violence starts to increase in Iraq and if the national 
elections scheduled for March this year do not go 
well, then Iraq will be once again be thrust onto the 
centre stage of American politics. Then Obama, who 
has greatly benefited from his predecessor’s polices, 
is in trouble as he appears to have little by way of 
contingency planning if things do not continue to 
unfold in a comparatively benign fashion.
19
